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Abstract
The arrival of Internet offers both opportunities for incremental efficiency gains
and complete industry redefinition presenting new value propositions and hence
leading to the emergence of new businesses and industries. One particular case is
that of the horizontal portal industry, with consistently the most visited sites on the
Web. Nevertheless, and despite the ongoing concentration of the market, overall
profitability remains low. In this paper we argue that, although the industry has a
great potential for value creation, value appropriation in information-based
businesses remains problematic. Still, interest in this industry is huge, which is
understandable if one analyzes the industry within its online value network. As we
show, horizontal portals constitute a critical link in this network, as it is both a way
of organizing content, which seems to be the king of the future, and captures and
canalizes the incoming traffic of the Internet Service Providers. Still, they face a
number of hurdles to capture the value they generate and become profitable.
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1.

Introduction

New technologies, and the arrival of the Internet in particular, have shown to have a
profound impact on today's' businesses. As with almost all technological changes,
the early and actually most obvious changes are of incremental nature, resulting in
cost savings, as it gets cheaper to do things that we are already doing. Nevertheless,
a second, more profound effect may be observed over time, as we discover that we
can do completely new things with that technology, or that the technological change
transforms the nature of the businesses, hence opening new value proposition
opportunities (Christensen, 2000). The Internet is an enabling technology (Porter,
2001) that has allowed companies to affect both their demand and costs at the same
time creating what Kim and Mauborgne (1997) call “value innovations”. These
changes are hard to forecast, and to analyze, as industries become reshaped, and
markets therefore shift toward a new equilibrium. One of these markets is the
horizontal portal market.
In addition, to forecast whether a business model is viable, one has to differentiate
between value creation and value appropriation. Two years ago, it was believed that
the disruptive nature of Internet technology changed the fundamentals of business.
A new era of competition in which none of the old paradigms were valid was
heralded. The collapse of the technology market and the high profile failures of
many of the upstarting dotcoms, has shown us that the old business rules still apply.
Hence, the new e-businesses had shown great value propositions on the value
creation side, being it either through the reduction of transaction costs, search costs
or enhanced customization opportunities (Cassiman and Sieber, 2002). Still, value
appropriation appeared to be very problematic. Although new products and pricing
mechanisms may help companies in appropriating the created value, recent reality
has shown us that both increased rivalry and constant entrance of new competitors,
as well as increased market transparency pose significant challenges to value
appropriation by the firms.
In this paper we focus on a particular business activity that the Internet has allowed
to emerge, horizontal portals. Up to this moment, the industry is still drifting, and
the main players have adopted differing approaches in their competitive positioning.
We will analyze their strategies introducing the online value chain (Valor and Hess,
2002), dividing the overall value systems into different steps that represent more or
less profitable value propositions. We will show how value creation and value
appropriation occur on each of the steps. This framework allows us to better
understand the overall value propositions and value appropriation opportunities of
the main players. We will focus on three main observed strategies: pure players,
forward integrators, and backward integrators, analyzing their long-term feasibility.
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2.

The Horizontal Portal Industry

Early in the 1990's the first horizontal portals were born as simple search engines or
directories, offering Internet users an efficient way to filter through the immense
amount of information available on the Web. Over time, other services have been
added to the search engines including email, chat , and other information services,
as well as the possibility to customize the start-page of the portal, for example with
MyYahoo!. Since then, portals have evolved into full-service hubs of electronic
commerce, mail, online communities and customized news. They offer end-users a
place to start their exploration of the Internet, linking them to Web sites according
to their interests. Portals have consistently been the most visited sites on the Web.
Since many Web-surfers arrive first to portal sites, these companies are in a very
powerful position, giving them huge leverage over retailers and other firms that
need to be on their sites. Nonetheless, with the exception of a few portals, such as
Yahoo and AOL, these businesses are generally not profitable.
There are also two fundamental portal business models. One is the pure portal, such
as Yahoo!, which is an advertising or broadcasting model. The pure portal attracts
an audience by packaging and promoting content, and generates revenues by selling
advertising (usually rectangular banners) and by selling "anchor-tenant” positions.
The pure portal does not provide Internet access. Although this business model was
heralded as a paradigm of the new economy, Yahoo, the biggest portal in the world,
has suffered a crash in the stockmarket, reporting losses from previous gains (see
Figure 1), and its strategic long-term feasibility has been recently put into
questioning.

Figure 1: Yahoo! Stock Evolution, 200-2001
The second business model is the online service provider (OSP), such as AOL,
which combines the pure portal with Internet access, thus adding Internet access
revenues (subscriptions or percentage of phone call charges) to advertising and
tenant placement revenues. AOL, despite of having some problems after its merger
with Time Warner, does better than Yahoo!, maintaining earnings and valuation
(Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Comparison Stock Evolution: Yahoo! – AOL, 2000-2001.
A whole range of portals have either closed or repositioned their businesses. In this
way, Disney, who was drawing over 13 million unique users a month, decided to
close their flagship portal Go.com after having invested several billion dollars in its
Internet division. Similarly, Excite@ Home prepares to cease operations after
February 28, 2002.
The shakeout has begun and first tier portals (AOL, Yahoo!, MSN and Terra Lycos)
are capturing 70% to 80% of the visits and the top 10% of portals derive 71% of the
revenue (Rayport and Wirtz, 2001). Second-tier portals are fading, as there is
simply too little left over for them to run profitable businesses. Still, the future does
not seem too bright, and although scale is clearly important for success in the portal
industry, other factors definitely influence their overall performance.

2.1

Value Creation and Value Appropriation
in the Portal Industry

In this sense, on the value creation side, portals have considerably reduced the
users' search costs, hence creating positive value (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000). In
addition, their customization features, such as providing an email account, or giving
the possibility to personalize the portal's homepage, increases the created value
even further.
Nonetheless, value appropriation is difficult due to several reasons. First, rivalry
among portals is intense with large, deep-pocketed firms competing in the general
portal area and an increasing number of specialists entering vertical markets. Once
companies have invested in building the necessary infrastructure, they compete
aggressively to build the user-base to take advantage of low variable costs of
serving new customers. Mobility barriers among rivals are low, implying that for
every strategy that seems to be working, there are very few ways to keep the
competition from copying the strategy almost instantly, i.e. personal home pages
such as MyYahoo! The one asset that cannot be imitated is unique and exclusive
content. The ability to build and maintain partnerships will be critical to firms'
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success, as portals are becoming increasingly dependent upon third parties for much
of their content, services, and technologies.
Second, despite efforts to increase customer loyalty though customization,
switching costs for visitors to general portals are low. Unlike OSPs which charges
monthly fees to subscribers (at least in the U.S.), pure portals such as Yahoo! have
no contract to bind users to their site. In addition, as users become more
experienced with the Internet, they may migrate to more sophisticated or focused
portals, such as vertical portals. Also, low switching costs also limit e-commerce
revenue growth since users that initially purchase by passing through the portal may
bypass the portal and go directly to the e-tailer's site for future purchases, thus
disintermediating the portal from the transaction process.
Third, technological changes often require new technological architecture within
the portals. Because of low switching costs, it is critical to manage such changes
well, as delays or interruption in service may lead users to move to competitive
providers. Maintaining service is complicated by the fact that many portals depend
on third parties for critical elements of their architecture. Firms are spending
considerable amounts of money and resources to provide a variety of
communications services (email, instant messaging, calendaring and chat rooms).
They provide these and other basic communications services free of charge to users,
but have not yet determined an effective means of generating revenues from them.
Finally, in efforts to differentiate themselves and increase customer loyalty, portals
are investing millions, sometimes billions of dollars to obtain exclusive content.
The battle for such content is. In principle, driving content prices up and availability
down. However, as MacKie-Mason and Varian (1997) point out, a pricing
information services problem exists, as the pricing-by-replication scheme breaks
down, and completely new pricing schemes have to be developed (Cox, 1992),
although there are still several problems remaining to be solved before such
schemes can become widely used.
Once up and running, portals are global businesses. However unless they offer local
content and language, they will struggle to transfer success in their home markets to
foreign markets. Portals will also have to expand into devices beyond the PC,
primarily to wireless devices. These devices require a different platform or version
of the portals' service due to the lower resolution, functionality and memory of the
non-PC devices.

2.2

Strategic Challenges for Value Appropriation

A portal's success depends on generating the maximum visitor traffic possible,
hence overcoming perfect market transparency and lack of differentiation. This
involves attracting new visitors to their site, keeping visitors at the site for as long
as possible and convincing them to return (increase site “stickiness"), attracting
users that are interesting for advertisers, deriving better demographic and behavioral
information from users, and encouraging users to utilize the majority of the services
and products offered by the portal.
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Portals must continually enhance the customers' experience. If users cannot
accomplish what they set out to do at a site, they will go somewhere else. The
content must be: 1) updated frequently, 2) of local interest, 3) easily and quickly
accessible, and 4) accessible on an increasing range of Internet-access devices.
General portals are increasing their borders to the maximum so the user does not
have to leave or be redirected to another web page. An important strategy for
enhancing users' experience and achieving stickiness is to create a community
feeling for the visitors, a goal made possible by the chat technology. In this sense,
portals should pursue a systems competition rather than a component competition
(Farrell, Monroe, and Saloner, 1997).
Advertising on the Internet still offers tremendous potential, as it currently accounts
for less than one percent of all advertising spending (on- and off-line) worldwide.
Most Internet advertising is concentrated among a few of the top Web properties
(AOL and Yahoo! command 30% of the total in 1999); however, smaller sites are
gaining advertising share (AOL and Yahoo! combined for 55% of the total in
1996). A growing source of revenue is coming from e-commerce. The interactive
advertising element of e-commerce is made possible by web tracking software that
traces the source of the purchase to the banner ad. While these commissions are still
a relatively small percentage of a portal's total revenue, they are increasing rapidly.
Firms are spending considerable money and resources to establish and maintain
their brands. Due to the increasing number of competitors, it has become
increasingly difficult and expensive for portals to obtain quality television, radio,
magazine, Internet and other advertising space. Firms are expanding their services
to find new ways of differentiating. Many are expanding into the corporate market
by providing enterprise portal services, similar for example to MyYahoo!, but
focused on employees and their management of information at work. Such portals
are attempting to expand beyond the provision of content to the provision of online
solutions. As Lactovich and Smith (2001) reported in their study, investments in
these types of initiatives seem to be increasingly important to reach a differentiation
advantage.
Finally, because of the growing range of Internet devices being used, particularly
wireless, portals are forced to partner with other companies to ensure a presence in
all devices. For example, both AOL and Yahoo have signed multiyear contracts to
provide content to Sprint PCS, a wireless operator in the U.S.
Nevertheless, and despite of all these challenges and continuing reports of losses,
the horizontal portal industry remains of strategic importance to its main players.
This is because, of its strategic importance to other complementary industries, for
which it is necessary to analyze the competitive dynamics of horizontal portals
within a wider network, including at least Internet access providers (IAPs) and
Content providers. Therefore, to shed some light into the competitiveness of portals
we will resort to the traditional value chain model, introducing the online value
network in the next section of this paper.
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3.

The Online Value Network

The horizontal portal industry forms part of what Valor and Hess (2002) have called
the online value network. As industry transformation has taken place especially in
those industries in which information plays a key role, be it as content (such as the
media industry), as communication of information (such as the telecommunication
industry) or as the infrastructure for information (such as the computer and
electronics industry), all involved industries are suffering fundamental changes, and
are nowadays immersed in a process of industry convergence, during which
industries with new competitive dynamics have emerged. Changing value
propositions are being driven by the advances in information and communication
technology, namely growth in the use of the Internet. The result of these changes is
an interconnected, information-based economy that has created a new connection
between the customer and products or services. We refer to the industries making
up this connection as the online value network (Valor and Hess, 2002), shown in
figure 3. It has to be focused on where the value is and who is capable of capturing
the network. To identify this value, competitive factors, strategic approaches, and
trends within each stage of the network, have to be analyzed, as well as those
affecting the entire network. Of course profits need not be immediate, but they must
be achievable within a realistic or survivable time frame, as many former dotcoms
have learned. While we would hope to identify the factors that enable firms to not
only capture but to sustain value, we have to acknowledge that in the volatile
Internet environment, key factors can and do change.
• Internet Service Provider (ISP)
• Online Service Provider (OSP)
• Telecommunications
• Content Providers
• E-commerce
- E-tailers
- Infomediaries
- Market Makers

• Application Service
Provider (ASP)
• Telecommunications
• Software and
Hardware Vendors

• Plain old telephone
service (POTS)
• Cellular Network
• Cable
• Digital TV
• Satellite
• Radio

• Quicken Personal Financial
Management
• Microsoft Money
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• Macintosh
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Figure 3: The Online Value Network (Valor and Hess, 2002)
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In this way, the merger of America Online and Time Warner, completed in January
2001, aimed at becoming “the worlds first Internet-powered media and
communications company-which will connect, inform and entertain people
everywhere in innovative ways”1 shows that the transformation of the traditional
movie, media and telecommunication companies has just begun, and that industry
convergence will be ongoing. AOL Time Warner provides content through a variety
of companies of the publishing (Time Inc and Time Warner Trade Publishing),
filmed entertainment (Warner Bros and New Line Cinema), music (Warner Music
Group), and interactive video (AOL Time Warner Interactive Video) industries.
These contents are aggregated through their interactive services and properties
(America Online), and brought to the customer using their own Internet access
provider (America Online), as well as their own networks (Turner Broadcasting,
Home Box Office) and cable systems (Time Warner Cable). Thus, AOL Time
Warner has opted for an integrated strategy, as it wants to be present in both the
content, content aggregation, Internet access and telecommunication steps of the
online value network.

4.

Content Providers and e-Commerce

A full comprehension of horizontal portal strategies cannot be achieved without
taking into account the strategies of content providers. The first stage in the value
network consists of two different segments: 1) content providers, and 2)
e-commerce companies. Content providers include individuals or companies that
develop and/or distribute goods that can be digitized into bits (3), such as text, data,
audio, and video. E-commerce includes those individuals or organizations that trade
or facilitate trade over the Internet.
The content provider segment consists of a large and varied range of companies that
produce and deliver information and entertainment products that can be digitized,
such as news, music, and movies. The focus here is on two types of content
providers: 1) originators - those who create the content, such as writers or
musicians; and 2) packagers - those that traditionally have packaged and often
delivered this content, such as movie producers, newspapers, or book publishers.
Content (digitizable goods) defies the basic economic law of scarcity because when
it is sold, the seller still possesses it and can continue selling it - it never gets used
up. Once a physical object is sold, on the other hand, the seller no longer owns it.
Another unique factor of content is its cost structure. Producing information is
costly (high fixed costs, normally sunk costs), while reproducing it is not (marginal
costs of close to nothing), thus, profits increase rapidly as sales increase. In

1

AOL Time Warner Press Release, January 11, 2001
173

Sandra Sieber, Josep Valor

addition, there are normally no capacity limits to the production of additional
copies.
Despite the importance of high quality content, on the Internet a second,
increasingly important content has emerged. This content, contained in chats,
forums and discussion groups, is produced by their users, and therefore its
production costs are insignificant. In addition, it creates network externalities,
which in turn creates stickiness and hence fosters further production of more
content that again will attract more traffic to the site.
Information can be distributed globally, immediately, and at a very low cost. The
reduced cost of reproduction and distribution makes managing intellectual property
critical. In the music industry, for example, musicians and record producers are
battling to protect their property against rights to download music using MP3 and
Web sites like Napster, Gnutella and Audiogallaxy. Content packagers that package
unique content (such as books or music) are threatened with disintermediation as
the changing cost and distribution factors enable originators to bypass them. As a
result, access to exclusive content is critical to achieve differentiation and avoid
disintermediation. Competition for such content is intense, causing prices, and
therefore barriers to entry, to rise. On the other hand, information commodities such
as CD phone books are not viable because competition tends to push the price to
marginal cost, in this case essentially zero. As a result, giving information away on
the Internet is no surprise.
As Evans and Wurster (1999) explain, the Internet blows up the traditional tradeoff
between richness (detail) and reach (audience size). Companies can now provide
instantaneous, detailed~ interactive, multimedia, customized information (richness)
to global audiences (reach). This enables content companies to move from a
broadcasting model, in which one message is sent out to a large audience, to a
narrowcasting or pointcasting model, in which the content can be tailored to each
individual. The Internet also creates an important shift in bargaining power from the
seller to the buyer by allowing the user to actively control the process of
communication. For example, users can selectively choose or personalize the
information they want to receive.

4.1

Strategic Challengers for Content Providers
and Its Consequences for Horizontal Portals

The originators of content can use the Internet to appropriate more of the value they
create. For example, well-known authors such as Stephen King can now sell books
online to readers to capture all of the profits, thereby disintermediating publishers,
wholesalers and retailers. Many traditional intermediaries of original content have
had to form exclusive partnerships or acquire the content originators.
For other packagers, for example newspapers, the uniqueness of their offering
depends on the way in which they select and present the information. Since these
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companies are not threatened with disintermediation by the originator, they stand to
benefit much more from the changes brought on by the Internet. For these
packagers, company image is critical because it carries the brand name and
reputation that are important distinguishing factors for content in the Internet's
crowded environment. A major threat to these packagers is the new online
intermediaries because strong branding in the off-line world does not translate
automatically into a strong branding position online. For example, on the Internet
the largest financial information providers in the world today are not the Financial
Times (FT), The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Reuters, or Bloomberg, but rather AOL
and Yahoo!, and therefore horizontal portals are putting a considerable threat on the
positioning of these companies.
The Internet enables all content providers to increase profits through more effective
price discrimination strategies. Because the Internet enhances a firm's ability to
learn about individual customers, firms can more effectively identify customer
groups and offer different prices to the different segments based on their level of
demand. If groups are difficult to identify, a versioning strategy can be used. In this
case, firms can offer different versions of the same product and customers can
self-select the appropriate version based on their needs or level of interest. For
example, charging more for earlier releases than for later releases of the same
product, or charging more for full access than for limited access.
The increased ease of access to content through the diverse platforms (PCs, TVs,
mobile phones, and PDAs) that the Internet enables is bringing the client closer to
the primary source of the content. This phenomenon is moving the media
companies to the extremes of the network: the content or the user. The companies
that stay in the middle of these two extremes risk being disintermediated. These
factors are accelerating consolidation in the media sector as packagers are acquiring
content, for example the AOL-Time Warner merger. This process of concentration
is also driven by the challenge of both generating content and managing distribution
and technology in just one company.

5.

Internet Service Providers and Internet Access
Providers

ISPs (also called IAPs) are businesses that provide services to connect individuals
and companies to the Internet. An extension of the ISP is the online service
providers (OSP), such as America Online or Microsoft Network (MSN). The OSP
provides an integrated offering by combining Internet access with a portal that
includes exclusive and proprietary content. ISPs mainly generate revenue by
charging user subscription fees.
Currently consumers have several ways to connect to the Internet (DSL, cable,
wireless) though most still connect through "plain old telephone service- (POTS).
This method involves: 1) dialing up to an ISP over a modem and sending data
requests over the telephone line, 2) the ISP then sends the data request over another
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telephone line to the appropriate server, 3) the server sends the requested data back
to the ISP, and 4) the ISP sends the data to the individual requesting it.
Only a small percentage of ISPs are profitable due to a number of reasons. Barriers
to entry are low because of the relatively inexpensive infrastructure required to start
providing access. Acquiring users is expensive, requiring huge investments in
advertising to build brand. Switching costs are low because there is little
opportunity for pure ISPs to differentiate themselves aside from providing better
service or higher speed access, making differentiating strategies difficult to sustain.
The commodity status of access has led to a price war in the stage. Some firms have
adopted an advertising revenue model, thereby providing free Internet access for
consumers who are willing to provide personal information and permit a permanent
space on their screens for advertising. Although free ISPs spend much less
acquiring customers, the amount they generate in advertising revenue is still lower
than the actual cost of operating the network.
Economies of scale enable the firm to purchase access at lower rates and, if part of
their business model, to attract more advertisers. Economies of scope enable the
firm to capture the maximum profit possible from each subscriber, but the success
of bundling access with additional services depends on the quality of the customer
base and the likelihood of that customer base wanting other services. For example,
customers attracted to the free-ISP model may not be willing to pay for additional
services and may not be attractive for advertisers.
Regulation is important in determining the revenue model ISPs can pursue (see
Srinagesh, 1997). In the U.S. consumers pay a flat rate for local phone calls
regardless of how many local calls they make. This is referred to as unmetered
service. In Europe, however, local calls are metered, therefore, on top of a flat
monthly rate, users are charged based on the total minutes of local calls made. As a
result, ISPs in the U.S. generate revenue by charging a monthly access fee, usually
around $20, while in Europe ISPs provide free access and generate revenue by
taking a percentage (from 5% to 25%) of the local calls made to access the Internet.

5.1

Strategic Challenges for ISPs
and Its Consequences for Horizontal Portals

At a minimum, ISPs need to have the equipment and access to at least have a POP
(Point-of -presence, the place where they realize the physical connection to the
Internet) within their geographic market. In addition, larger ISPs often have their
own high-speed networks; therefore they are less dependent on the telecom
suppliers and can offer better service to their customers.
Competitive strategy in this stage of the value network primarily involves
combining additional value added services to the basic service of Internet access.
The goal is to differentiate the service, to create customer switching costs, and to
offer more profitable services to both grow and profit from the installed base. This
is exactly what AOL believed when it decided to acquire Time Warner. AOL is the
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largest ISP worldwide. TimeWarner is the largest content provider. To sustain its
competitive advantage, AOL felt it had to provide exclusive content.
Telecoms are creating their own ISPs, which greatly increases the level of
competition. They are taking advantage of their brands and relationships with the
customer. The access business can generate lots of additional traffic that passes
through their networks. Although additional revenues from access alone may be
small, it opens the door to new business areas that can generate new income
sources, such as access to the Internet through mobile phones.
In addition to telephone firms and ISPs, cable and satellite companies are also
competing in the race to deliver broadband service. Their technologies are able to
create a broadband “last mile" to the home that can be used to attack the local
telecom’s narrowband local loop. Since AOL and other ISPs do not have automatic
or guaranteed access to customers who use such broadband technologies to get onto
the Internet, broadband may have the power to determine who wins and who loses
in the Internet access industry.
The revenue structure of IAP’s shows that consumers have not shown a willingness
to pay for value-added services, such as email, as seventy percent of total income
comes from consumer access subscription fees. The remaining 30% of revenues is
generated by expanding into hosting for businesses that are migrating to the Web.
Alternative sources of revenue will continue to increase in importance, leading ISPs
to converge with other stages of the network. Primarily, ISPs are becoming OSPs portals with Internet access.

6.

Conclusions: Possible Future Avenues of Horizontal
Portals

Horizontal portals are key players within the broader value network. Hence, and
taking into account that the volatility of the Internet may provoke the appearance of
new factors that may induce to new and dramatic shifts, some main conclusions
may be drawn from the previous analysis.
1.

Horizontal portals create value for many users, but they seem unable to
appropriate any, this going to infrastructure and access providers, and content
owners

2.

The industry is subject to large economies of scale, prompting consolidation

3.

An advertisement-based business model is unlikely to succeed given the low
audiences of most portals and the lack of focus of horizontal mega portals.
Click rates are low, and advertising opportunities are ample for advertisers

4.

Portals need proprietary content to differentiate from their competitors. Of this,
content provided by users in the forms of chats and clubs are the most effective
as they costs only the fixed infrastructure and provide both network
externalities and stickiness to the site
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5.

Pure-play Internet Access Providers have most if the same problems as portals,
as they cannot differentiate their offer much, having to resort to compete in
price. Bundling on the internet access with telephony or cable access seem the
obvious strategy due to economies of scope to the provider and client

6.

The bundling of IAP-portal-content provider may be the only possible strategy
given the idiosyncrasies of each business that impede them to effectively
compete in isolation in their step on the value chain
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